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1American employers and workers underinvest in employer training. Under-
investment occurs because training generates externalities, because turnover
is excessive, because the tax system discourages training investment, and
because workers lack access to loans that would allow them finance heavy
investments in training (Bishop 1991). During the election campaign,
President Clinton proposed stimulating training by requiring employers to
spend some minimum percentage of their wage bill on training or else be
subject to a special tax. France has had such a mandate since 1972, so the
design of an American training mandate is likely to benefit from a careful
examination of the French program. The French have demonstrated that a
training mandate is administratively and politically feasible, but their
mandate is not optimally designed for U.S. implementation. The paper
concludes with some recommendations about how a U.S. mandate to spend on
training should be structured.
DE FRENCH MANDATE. TO SPEND ON TRAINING
Legislated mandates to spend on formal training are a central component
of the French system of continuing education and training. Employers and
unions established the foundations of this system with the National
Intersectoral Agreement of July 9, 1970 which was later amended to cover
managers and professionals on April 30, 1971. This agreement was enacted into
law on the 16th of July 1971 and is referred to by that date. Every employer
with 10 or more employees was obligated to spend .8 percent of its wage bill
on continuing education and training of its employees or pay a tax equal to
the difference between its obligated and actual training expenditure. In
addition, every employer regardless of size was required to spend .5 percent
of its wage bill on apprenticeship training or pay a tax equal to the
difference between its obl~gated and actual training expenditure (Berton and
Podevin 1991).
The mandated training tax for continuing training was raised to 1.0
percent of wage bill in 1974, to 1.1 percent in 1977, and to 1.2 percent in
1987. Beginning January 1993, the mandated spending level is 1.4 percent.
Since the initiation of the mandate, the share of the wage bill spent on
formal training has risen substantially, from 1.35 percent in 1972 to 3.14 in
21990. Firms are required to develop a training plan and present it to the
firm's labor management committee (these committees were already required by
French industrial relations legislation). This committee's role is advisory
only, however. Management generally decides which skills are to be taught,
who is to be trained, and when. Other times employees take the initiative.
The government is not involved in these decisions and bureaucracy has been
kept to a minimum. The auditing of company reports of training expenditure
requires a staff of only 120 controllers for the entire nation.
Eligible ezpenditures: The obligation to invest in continuing education
and training can be fulfilled by five different types of expenditure:
* the firm's own formal training programs (These must have a curriculum,
develop a skill that is useful at more than one firm and be located
away from the trainee's normal work station.),
*
external training (often cooperative programs organized by groups of
employers) ,
* training insurance funds agreed to by management and labor,
*
government approved training programs for unemployed youth who have no
qualifications (Within the overall 1.4 percent mandate, firms are
required to spend at least 0.3 percent of their wage bill on these
programs or be subject to the tax),
* wages and tuition of employees taking courses at schools and colleges
(Firms are required to spend at least 0.15 percent of their wage bill
on in-school training of employees or be subject to tax. This is the
only manda~e that firms with fewer than 10 employees are subject to.
The first panel of Table 1 indicates how firms of different size
allocated their eligible training expenditures in 1988. Internal training
accounted for 28 percent of the eligible training expenditures reported to
French authorities by all firms. Large firms spent heavily on this kind of
training, small firms did not. Training programs organized by outside
vendors, many of which are provided by organizations formed by industry
councils and other groups of employers, accounted for another 35 percent of
eligible training expenditures. The firms with 50 to 2000 employees were the
heaviest users of this kind of training.
Union-management training insurance funds accounted for 37 percent of
the eligible training expenditure of firms with 10-19 employees, but only 4
percent of the @xp8nditures of the largest firms. Contributions to government
3approved training programs for unemployed youth accounted for 25-27 percent
of training expenditures by firms with under 50 employees and 13 percent of
the training expenditures of firms with 2000+ employees. Wages and tuition
for employees attending schools and universities accounted for 7 percent of
training expenditures.
Impacts: French leaders believe the training mandate has stimulated the
growth of formal training, professionalized it and aided French
competitiveness. Hillary Steedman, a British economist who has done extensive
field research on the productivity and skills of French workers, also believes
that the mandate has significantly stimulated investment in training and
improved worker skills. The two human resource executives of American multi-
national corporations operating in France I have interviewed about the mandate
also praised the system.
studies have found that individuals receiving training are significantly
more likely to receive internal promotions and 2 to 3 times more likely to
transition from unskilled to skilled occupations. This is just as true for
training initiated by the worker as for training initiated by the employer.
For those who were in unskilled jobs in 1980, individuals who initiated their
own training in the next 5 years had a 58 percent probability of being in a
skilled job in 1985 and those who took training at the behest of their
employer had a 55 percent chance of being in a skilled job. Those who
received no formal training between 1980 and 1985, by contrast, had only a 20
percent chance of moving up to a skilled job by 1985 (Berton and Podevin
1991).
flho Gets Trained? As in other nations, formal training is more extensive
at large firms and for more skilled workers (see Table 1). In 1990, firms
with 10-19 employees spent 1.30 percent of their wage bill on formal training,
barely more than the 1.2 percent mandate. By contrast, firms with more than
2000 employees spent 4.99 percent on average on formal training, more than
three times the mandate. Those receiving training averaged about 46 hours
dur ing the year. This varied little by firm size and skill level. The
incidence of training, however, varies substantially. Slightly over one-half
of supervisors, technicians, managers and professionals receive formal
training each year. One in four craft, sal@s and clerical workers and one in
.."
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eight unskilled operatives receive formal training each year. The incidence
of formal training is considerably higher in France than in the United States.
*
Advantages: The French mandate to spend has some important advantages:
Employer needs for skill upgrading determine the allocation of funds so
the risk that people will be trained for jobs that don't exist or in
skills that do not increase productivity is small. Trainees get to use
the skills they develop.
*
Decisions are made by managers and workers on the shop floor.
* Training generally occurs at the work site where it is both more
effective and more convenient.
*
Trainees are more motivated because promotions often depend on their
success in training.
*
Training of both the employed and unemployed is encouraged.
Disadvantages: The French system al so has some important disadvantages:
* Six-million of the 9 million French workers employed by firms subject
to the training tax are at firms which regularly exceed the mandated
amount. The training mandate clearly has no effect on the incentive to
train these 6 million workers. Since 1984, firms which increase their
training budget from one year to the next are eligible for a tax credit
equal to 25 percent of the increase in training expenditure (Luttringer
1991). For firms already spending more than the mandated 1.4 percent
of wage bill, the tax credit, not the mandate, is probably the primary
inducement for expanding training.
* Another 27 percent of workers are employed at firms which report
spending exactly 1.2 percent (the mandate that applied in 1990) of wage
bill on training. While some of these firms increased their training
expenditure to the required minimum because of the mandate, program
administrators report that many smaller companies simply stop keeping
track of their training expenditure once they reach the tax threshold.
It is not clear, how much of the response to the mandate is creative
accounting and how much is real behavioral change.
* Firms whose expendi~ures on formal training would have been below 1.4
percent of payroll in the absence of the mandate, save in taxes the
full amount of any increase in expenditures on training. Some
administrators of the French program fear that this has induced a
careless attitude toward costs and reduced the efficiency of training.
* Expenditures on formal training reduce the firm's tax liability; but
the costs of informal training do not. In the United States formal
training accounts for less than 15 percent of the time that new
5employees at small and medium size companies spend learning their job;
informal training and learning by watching others accounts for the
rest. This feature of the mandate generates a strong incentive to
substitute formal training for informal training despite the fact that
there is no evidence (either of an empirical or theoretical variety)
establishing that formal training is more cost effective than informal
training (Bishop 1991).
* Formal training is subject to substantial economies of scale, so small
firms are put at a disadvantage. The kind of training which small
companies excel at--close supervision and informal training by the
owner--is not eligible for subsidy. Small firms must join together in
cooperative efforts to achieve the scale necessary to make formal
training feasible.
of these problems can be avoided, however, by modifying its structure.Most
HOW SHOULD AN AMERICAN TRAINING MANDATE BE DESIGNED?
The source of most of the problems with the French training mandate is
the 100 percent offset of training expenditure for tax obligation. It is this
feature that results in a few firms (those spending below the mandated level)
having little incentive to train efficiently and most other firms facing no
incentive to increase training above the level they would have chosen in the
absence of the program. An American training mandate can avoid these problems
by offering only a 20 or 25 cents reduction in tax for every dollar of
training expenditure. This generates strong incentives to use cost effective
It also means that the tax rate can be low and yet antraining techniques.
incentive to expand training is generated even for companies that normally
spend 4 percent of their wage bill on training.
All employers--profit making, nonprofit, and governmental--should be
subject to the training tax. As an administrative convenience, the mandate
should not apply to very small organizations. Furthermore, it should set
proportionately higher training targets for larger firms. This can be
accomplished by making the training tax progressive. For example, there might
be no tax on the first $40,000 of the firm's wage bill, a 0.5 percent tax on
the next $5, 000, 000 of the wage bill, a o.75 percent tax on the next
$5,000,000 of wage bill and 1.0 percent on all wages paid above that. Taxes
paid would go into a dedicated training trust fund that would be a source of
federal funding of technical assistance to firms considering expanding their
6training programs, JTPA, apprenticeship programs, school based vocational
training and research and development into improved training techniques.
With a 20 cents on the dollar tax offset, a 1 percent tax rate implies
that the very largest firms would not be released from paying tax until they
were spending over 5 percent of their wage bill on formal training programs.
Once accountants are given the task of identifying the full costs of their
existing formal training programs (including the time of trainees), this will
not be a difficult target for most companies to meet. The average French firm
with more than 2000 employees currently spends this proportion of their
payroll on formal training.
Quality control: -As a quality control measure, firms would be required
to give certificates describing the skills taught and competencies achieved
to trainees at the completion of training. These certificates would make the
individual more marketable at other firms and strengthen worker incentives to
engage in training. As a further quality control measure, companies above a
certain size would be required to develop a training plan and present it to
a training advisory committee that contains worker representation. Public
companies would be expected to describe their investments in formal training
in their annual report. In order to avoid a conflict of interest in the
allocation of training investments, tax offsets would not be available for
training received by the owner and top managers.
Initially, the categories of training expenditures that could offset the
tax would be similar to those in France: apprenticeship training programs,
industry training funds, labor-management training funds, tuition
reimbursements for job-related training, contributions of materials or staff
time to vocational-technical institutions, the employer's share of JTPA OJT
training expenses and the firm's formal training programs for new and
continuing employees.' The costs of certain types of informal training (as
specified in Department of Labor regulations) would also be used to offset the
training tax. Apprenticeship programs for 16 to 21 year olds for high skill
jobs generate particularly large externalities, so it would be desirable to
structure the mandate to "give special encouragement to this kind of training.
This could be done by offering a larger tax reduction (eg. 40 cents per
training dollar rather than the 20 cents per training dollar) for expenditures
7on apprentice training programs that meet quality standards promulgated by
industry associations and approved by the Department of Labor. other types
of training (for example, training which awards industry recognized
credentials or academic credit) might be similarly encouraged by offering a
better tax offset ratio.2
Bncouraging Informal rraining: The major drawback of the system
described so far is its tendency to promote formal training programs at the
expense of job rotation and other more informal methods of learning and
training on the job. Japanese workers are better trained than American
workers not because they are more likely to take company sponsored courses
(expenditure on such courses is in fact lower in Japan than in the US and
France, Dore and Sako 1989), but because they receive continuous upgrading
training through job rotation and the Kaizen process. It is very important
for an American training mandate to promote informal learning on the job
through job rotation, obtaining assistance from coworkers, self study and
learning by doing. The Department of Labor should be tasked with the job of
writing regulations which would accomplish this.3
One strategy that needs to be investigated would be to award training
tax offsets for learning outcomes rather than for training expenditure. The
McAllister Commission is considering whether the Department of Labor should
promote the development of a nationwide skill certification system for
industry and occup'ation specific skills. If the Department of Labor decides
to go ahead with such a program, employer use of the certification system
could be insured by awarding training tax offsets to firms which train their
workers to industry standards and arrange for them to be tested and certified.
Incentives to engage in self study could be enhanced by giving those who
demonstrate their competence a small monetary award along with their skill
certificate. Without such a system of incentives to attract workers and firms
into the skill certification process, I doubt that a skill certification
system will gain the scale necessary for sustainability.
When designing a training mandate there will be a temptation to become
overly prescriptive about the type of training that is to be allowed to offset
the tax. The failure of prescriptive regulation of schooling inputs to
produce quality outcomes is a lesson that the designers of a training mandate
8need to take to heart. There is substantial evidence that employer training
often yields very high returns, but the number of studies that have measured
the productivity outcomes of training is very small. The research base is
presently too thin to form a basis for government picking and choosing amongst
types of training or objects of training. The profit motive is probably what
has insured training's cost effectiveness in the past. Too many regulations
could get in the way of the profitability calculation and reduce training's
effectiveness.
Influencing Who is Trained: The training mandate outlined above will
increase the incidence and intensity of employer training without changing its
basic character or its distribution. Employers clearly believe that skilled
workers need more formal training than unskilled workers (ie. that profitable
opportunities for training skilled workers are more numerous than for training
unskilled workers). The result is that managers and skilled workers get more
formal training than unskilled workers. Some analysts believe this is a
problem that requires government intervention.
A training mandate could be structured with a bias toward training those
with less skill. Training received by low wage workers or young workers
might generate higher tax offsets. Alternatively, separate training taxes
could be imposed on exempt and non-exempt employees and the mandate coul'
apply separately to each group of workers.
Should profft and productivity calculations be the sole determinants of
who gets trained? Or should a training mandate favor the training of the
firm's least skilled workers? The answer is not clear. While the absence of
loan financing of general training and the turnover explanations of
under investment in training apply most of all to young and disadvantaged
workers, the externalities that training is thought to generate--discoveries,
artistic contributions, reduced risks of catastrophic errors--appear to arise
primarily in high level occupations. How should distributional issues be
evaluated? Should the goal be equal opportunity to compete for jobs which
offer training or equalizing training outcomes? While evidence about
externalities can inform policy choices,
political and moral one.
the judgement is ultimately a
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Table 1
Forma 1 Training in French Companies
by Size of Firm
Number of EmDlovees
10-19 20-49 50-499 500-1999 2000+ Total
Share of 1988 TraininQ Expenditure for
Internal Training 1% 2% 6% 17% 50% 28%
Joint External Training 26% 31% 42% 46% 29% 35%
Union-Management Funds 37% 33% 22% 11% 4% 11%
Training of Youth 27% 25% 23% 19% 13% 19%
Time off to Attend School 9% 9% ~7% 4% 7%
100 100 100 100 100 100
TraininQ's Share of the WaQeBill
in 1974 .66% .86% 1. 14% 1.45% 2.59% 1.63%
in 1990 1.30% 1.45% 2.17% 3.20% 4.99% 3.14%
Hours of Training 41 43 41 44 53 46
per Trainee-1990
Share ReceivinQ TraininQ in 1990
All Employees 8% 11% 23% 39% 53% 32%
Unskilled Operatives 2% 4% 9% 15% 22% 13%
Skilled Operatives 6% 7% 16% 29% 48% 25%
Other Non-Supervisory 8% 11% 24% 37% 46% 29%
Supervisors & Tech. 15% 19% 38% 55% 70% 53%
Managers & Professional 13% 21% 41% 62% 71% 50%
Share of Covered Employment 5% 15% 32% 19% 30% 100%
Source: Centre d"Etudes et de Recherches sur les Qualifications, Statistiaue de la
Formation Professionnelle Continue Financee par les EntreDrises: Annees 1989-1990.
Tables 13 and Fabienne Derton & Gerard Podevin, "Vingt Ans de Formation
Professionnelle Continue: De la Promotion Sociale a la Gestion de 1'Emploi,"
Formation EmDloi, No. 34, Avril-Juin 1991, 14-30, Table 2 & 3.
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ENDNOTES
1. To ensure that only training gets subsidized and not vacations or
motivational sales meetings, eligible expenditures might be defined to
exclude: (1) travel to remote sites other than the company's national
or the appropriate regional headquarters~ (2) housing and food expenses
above a specified daily rate; (3) costs of training non-employees,
part-time employees working less than 50 hours a month, or employees
for whom more that 50 percent of compensation comes from commissions~
and (4) payments to speakers or presenters of a training session above
a specified amount per contact hour. The costs of developing a
training package or system for use in training one's own staff would be
an allowable expense.
2. The French promote particular kinds of training by having sub-mandates
requiring all firms to spend at least X percent of wage bill on a
particular category of formal training. Unless a case can be made that
it is undesirable for some firms to specialize in one kind of training
(say apprenticeships) ofwhile specialize inothers other forms
training, sub mandates will be a less efficient way of stimulating
particular types of training than varying the tax offset ratio. If it
is felt that all workers regardless of where they are employed should
have access to certain types of external training, the best way to
promote it 'is to locate it in schools and subsidize its costs there.
3. Boundaries between formal training and informal training are inevitably
elastic. Any system of subsidizing training (whether tax credit,
mandate or direct subsidy) will induce employers to formalize some on-
the-job learning activities that previously did not meet the program's
eligibility requirements. The mandate approach to stimulating training
is attractive in part because the public is less likely to feel that it
is unfair or reprehensible for employers to respond in this way to a
training mandate than to a direct subsidy or tax credit.
